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INTRODUCTION

-

To answer Hamlet's famous question - to be or not to be - in the
positive, requires for many a leap of faith. That leap represents the
notion that there is something or someone worth living for, despite even
the worst human suffering that makes the idea that human life possesses
an inviolable dignity unbelievable.I For many, that something is God:
an omnipotent and omniscient higher power that accords human beings
with that inviolable dignity.
Many, of course, question taking this particular jump. These
skeptics believe not only that God does not exist, but also that the
reasons for humans to live can easily be found in the non-divine realm,
whether in the scientific, psychological, historical, or philosophical.
These reasons, many believe, can be found even in the face of the worst
possible human suffering.
However, any such justifications must require taking some kind of
jump. None of them can escape the cold, hard truth about the current
and, notwithstanding so far unimaginable advances in our
epistemology, eternal - limits of human knowledge. For example, the
simple fact is that humans cannot directly observe and experience the
past or future. As such, the deceptively profound fact is that, even if we
have experienced the same thing for many years, we can never say with
absolute certainty that the same thing will hold as true for tomorrow. In
this sense, even the most empirical and scientific observations require
some jump, even if ultimately justified, to draw many of the
conclusions we universally take for granted.
The complex question undergirding this Article thus arises: what
exactly does it mean for human beings to take these epistemological
leaps? Of course, this is a vast question, one that has been explored,
time and again, by others. Rather than tackling every aspect of this
question, this Article has far less ambitious, yet somewhat novel goals:
to explore how these leaps are taken in modern science, which has
challenged traditional paradigms of scientific empiricism, and to see
what. implications this field has for ascertaining the demarcation
between science and faith - particularly in the eyes of the law.

1.
See generally John Paul II, Evangelium. Vitae (Mar. 25, 1995),
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hf jpii enc_25031995_evangelium-vitaeen.html.
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-

To compare the epistemological methods in science and faith is, of
course, not a new endeavor. Indeed, before discussing how modem
science should impact debates over demarcation, this Article will
explore some of the primary vehicles through which the comparison
between science and religion has traditionally been made: among them,
debates over whether creationism and intelligent design qualify as bona
fide sciences. But, rather than attempting to add anything to these
specific debates, this Article instead purports to explore the less welltread subject of how scientific acceptance of irresolutely non-religious,
modem concepts, such as string theory and multiverse theory, impacts
the so-called line of demarcation between science and (normally, faithdriven) pseudoscience. These are concepts for which experimental
confirmation not only remains presently elusive, but also are forever
outside the capability of human observation, regardless of technology.
Narrowing its focus to this subject, this Article recognizes novel
observations about making principled distinctions between science and
faith. Contrary to advocating for religion as something in which human
belief is somehow merited, this Article concludes that fundamental
differences certainly remain between science and religion as
traditionally conceived - differences for which the law must account.
At the same time, in light of advances that arguably redefine science,
this Article concludes that demarcation between science and faith
should proceed in a different way - particularly when the law is called
on to engage in such demarcation.
In particular, the growing elision between the two recommends
against a legal approach that attempts to determine wholesale whether
an entire theory qualifies as "scientific." Instead, it recommends an
approach that attempts to ascertain a religious purpose, which can
involve a more nuanced analysis of an alleged theory's many
constituent parts, in order to smoke out religious purpose. Such an
approach, this Article concludes, is consistent with the purpose of the
Establishment Clause, the central question of which remains whether
something is religious, as opposed to scientific. But, perhaps even more
importantly, it is also consistent with the desirability of leaving room
for legitimate debates about all theories, secular or otherwise
including, hypothetically, theories that demonstrate more good-faith,
global commitment to scientific principles than theories like creation
science, but which still challenge the traditional paradigms of science.
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Part I of this Article explores the basic distinction between science
and faith through the lens of the debate and litigation surrounding
creation science. Part II introduces a variety of modem scientific
theories, including quantum mechanics and string theory, and discusses
how these fields have more recently questioned our traditional
perception of what counts as science. It speaks in depth about these
debates within the scientific community itself, apart from any
consideration of theories motivated by religion. Finally, Part III
discusses how these ideas challenge how courts go about determining
what is science and what is pseudoscience that, typically with a faith
component, violates the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Article concludes with a note about how society should proceed in
such oft-divisive, but fundamentally important, inquiries.
I. SCIENCE VERSUS FAITH TRADITIONALLY

To understand how a comparison and contrast of quantum
mechanics and related' fields can illuminate how human beings take
leaps of faith, it is helpful first to assume a bird's eye view of what
distinguishes science and mathematics from other fields, including
religion. As this Part of the. Article will discuss, what ultimately
distinguishes these is how precisely they treat empiricism.
Perhaps nothing is more useful for exploring the differences
between science and faith than considering whether something
traditionally associated with faith - creationism, or so-called creation
science - should actually be considered scientific. This question has
generated a great deal of controversy. But perhaps most illuminating
here is the controversy within the group that rejects creationism as
science - a controversy over why creationism should be rejected as
legitimate science. This controversy provides us insight into why
empiricism matters in science - and why empiricism, too, has some
limits.
In American legal history, this controversy visibly manifested itself
in the wake of the case McLean v. Arkansas,2 where the teaching of
creation science faced a claim in court that it violated the Establishment
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 3 The case arose after Arkansas passed

2.
3.

McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
Id. at 1256-57.
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a law mandating "balanced" treatment of creation science and evolution
science in schools. 4 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas ruled that the law did violate the Establishment Clause
because creation science is not, in fact, a science.5 In doing so, Judge
William Overton famously laid out why: because creation science is
untestable; non-tentative - that is, dogmatic, or purporting to be the
final word; and unfalsifiable. 6
Though the McLean decision kept creationism out of classrooms,
Judge Overton's analysis has been criticized by some who ultimately
agreed with the final result. The most prominent critic has been
philosopher of science Larry Laudan, who says that "to make the interlinked claims that Creationism is neither falsifiable nor testable is to
assert that Creationism makes no empirical assertions whatever. That is
surely false. Creationists make a wide range of testable assertions about
empirical matters of fact." 7 Laudan highlights, for example, their
position that Earth is only thousands of years old; that most of its
surface has geological features that are products of the flood in Noah's
time (i.e., diluvial); and that there is a limited variety of species - all
positions that flow naturally from a literal interpretation of the Old
Testament.8 Creationists, Laudan points out, also make many factual
historical claims flowing from the events described in the Old
Testament. 9 "Indeed, if any doctrine in the history of science has ever
been falsified, it is the set of claims associated with creation-science,"
Laudan concludes. 10

4.

Id.; see also Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-

Science Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 80-1663 (Supp. 1981) ("Public schools within this
State shall give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science.").
5. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1267 ("[The law] lacks legitimate educational value
because 'creation science' as defined in that section is simply not science."); see also
id. at 1272.
6. Id. at 1267-68. Judge Overton also charged that creationism is not guided by,
or explanatory by reference to, natural law, because it "depends upon a supernatural
intervention." Id.
7. Larry Laudan, Commentary - Science at the Bar: Causesfor Concern, 7 SCI.,
TECH., & HUMAN VALUES 16, 16 (1982).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 17.
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Laudan does concede that there are many key suppositions of
creation science that are beyond being testable in isolation - for
example, the divinity of a human being.II However, Laudan points out
that many claims in science are not testable directly, in isolation. 12 Put
differently by theoretical physicist Brian Greene:
Objects that have always been beyond our cosmic horizon are objects
that we have never observed and never will observe; conversely, they
have never observed us, and never will.... Yet, I think we can agree
that such objects are as real as anything tangible, and so is the realism
they inhabit. . .. These examples make clear that science is no
stranger to theories that include elements, from basic ingredients to
derived consequences, that are inaccessible. 13

Laudan also criticizes Judge Overton's argument that the non-tentative
nature of creation science should disqualify it from science. Apart from
the fact that creationists have changed at least some of their ideas over
time, if not necessarily their core ideas, Laudan notes that in every era
in the history of science, some beliefs universally accepted as scientific
have been, in practice, not open to rejection. 14 "Would Newton, for
instance, have been tentative about the claim that there were forces in
the world? Are quantum mechanicians willing to contemplate giving up
tlie uncertainty relation?" Laudan asks.15
Laudan concludes that it is unhelpful to deem wholesale that
creation science is not a science. Rather, the individual claims made by
Creationism should be criticized one by one. 16
As this controversy clearly shows, what is commonly viewed as a
distinguishing factor between science and faith is how each treats the
concept of empiricism. On the one hand, there is clearly not full
agreement as to exactly how the empiricism of science can be said to
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. BRIAN GREENE, THE HIDDEN REALITY: PARALLEL UNIVERSES AND THE
DEEP LAWS OF THE COSMOS 169 (2011).
14.

Laudan, supra note 7, at 17.

15. Id.
16. Id. at 18 ("Rather than taking on the creationists obliquely and in wholesale
fashion by suggesting that what they are doing is 'unscientific' tout court ... we
should confront their claims directly and in piecemeal fashion by asking what
evidence and arguments can be marshal[1]ed for and against each of them.").
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differ from the empiricism (or apparent lack thereof) in faith. On the
other hand, the terms of the debate emphasize that empiricism, one way
or the other, is what distinguishes what is commonly accepted as
science from what is commonly conceived as faith.
For example, Laudan rightfully states that, even in science, many
claims are not testable in and of themselves. However, attempting to
prove or disprove that God exists, at least intuitively, seems different
from attempting to prove or disprove theories that are commonly
accepted as scientific even if they cannot be proven directly. For
example, even to the extent that many of Christianity's historical and
scientific claims are true, to infer that Jesus was, in fact, divine seems
of a different nature than to infer that, for example, subatomic particles
exist even though we cannot see them. As Greene states, while a
scientific theory need not have all its features be verified, it must still
have a robust assortment of confirmed predictions to be accepted,
which naturally requires a robust assortment of the theory's features to
be verifiable in the first place.1 7 In the case of proving the existence of
subatomic particles, this threshold is surely met. Mathematical
equations map out how an entire system of phenomena are linked to
each other, and though some of these phenomena are not, and perhaps
never can be, observable, many parts are observable, allowing for
confidence in the theory as a whole.II
By contrast, while Christians can argue that a number of falsifiable
historical and scientific claims support their contention that Jesus not
only existed, but was divine' 9 - and can hypothetically situate those
GREENE, supra note 13, at 169.
18. As Greene further states, "Ifthe experimental and observational evidence
supporting a theory compels you to embrace it, and if the theory is founded on such a
tight mathematical structure that there's no room for cherry-picking among its
features, then you have to embrace all of it." Id. at 170.
19. Some historical evidence for the existence of Jesus as a human being
certainly exists. Historical evidence also exists showing that many people believed
that Jesus was a divine figure. See generally LARRY W. HURTADO, LORD JESUS
CHRIST: DEVOTION TO JESUS IN EARLIEST CHRISTIANITY (2003). Of course, historical
evidence also exists to show that many people did not believe that Jesus was a divine
figure - the Bible itself captures the doubt that existed during and after the period of
Jesus's life. See, e.g., Luke 22:70 (describing doubts expressed by Jesus's
contemporaries, shortly before his crucifixion, as to his status as the son of God). The
totality of this evidence alone may be enough for some in the present also to believe
that Jesus is a divine figure, the Son of God. To do so, however, is undoubtedly a leap

17.
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claims within a larger, purportedly comprehensive and internally
consistent theory - they are undoubtedly much further from this
threshold. In the absence of mathematics and the precision it provides
to explain an entire system - a precision that allows for our confidence
when only parts of that system are directly verifiable - the quantity and
quality of falsifiable claims of Christianity cannot accomplish as much.
In the end, Christianity (as with most, if not all faiths) amounts to an
attempt to explain the universe and all of its constituent parts - past,
present, and future, observable and unobservable - like a grand "theory
of everything," a theory that has eluded scientific history despite all its
advances.
At the same time, it is also clear from the controversy over creation
science, particularly the controversy within the camp that rejects it as
science, that the power of empiricism can only go so far. Even with the
presence of empirical evidence, there remains at least a small jump to
believe that something is something like a transcendent truth, even if it
does align with our own experiences. One of the greatest examples in
the history of science is one that Laudan useS 20 : Newton, who could
mathematically show that a force called gravity existed by which
particles in the universe were attracted to each other, but remained silent
as to how exactly gravity exerted its influence. 21 It was only hundreds
of years later that Albert Einstein could even theoretically posit that it
was spacetime itself through which gravity worked - particularly, that
the presence of massive bodies in space affected the shape of space,
guiding other objects towards it.22 As much theory and empirical
evidence existed then to support Newton's theory of gravity, to believe
in that theory during his time still required a not insubstantial jump.
Indeed, some have even questioned whether the arguably grandest
ambition of science - to find immutable and final principles that explain
the behavior of the particles of the universe - is not, itself, something
of faith, as the existence of Jesus as traditionally thought of by Christians belies so
many scientific principles otherwise thought to be set in stone - a human person being
raised from the dead, for example. As lawyer and author Dean Overman has stated,
"Ifone believes in God's existence, it is done by faith." DEAN L. OVERMAN, A CASE
FOR THE DIVINITY OF JESUS 145 (2009).

20.
21.
22.
space and

Laudan, supra note 7, at 18.
GREENE, supra note 13, at 13.
Id. at 13-14 (describing how Einstein's theory explains the curvature of
time as a result of the presence of matter and energy).
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outside the realms of science. As prominent theoretical physicist Lee
Smolin has stated, such a fundamental theory "must in some sense exist
prior to the universe, so that the things in the world may obey it from
23
literally the first instant of the creation of the world." This can be
compared to the Big Bang Theory, which physicists make clear
describes what happened immediately after the creation of our universe
as we know it now - not the conditions of the universe at the
hypothetical time zero. 24 As such, "belief in a final theory shares with
a belief in a god the idea that the ultimate cause of things in this world
is something that does not live in the world but has an existence that,
somehow, transcends it." 2 5 Smolin continues:

This is why the belief in god and belief in the existence in a final
theory are both related to the metaphysical idea that what is really
true about the world is true about a timeless transcendent realm and
26
not about the world of the things we see around us.

Smolin concludes that he "do[es] not see, really, how science, however
much it progresses, could lead us to an understanding of these
questions. In the end, perhaps there must remain a place for
mysticism." 2 7 This calls to mind the philosophy of existentialist Jean-

Paul Sartre, who argued that if "we tried to ask ourselves what 'was
there' before a world existed, and if we replied 'nothing,' we would be
forced to recognize that this 'before' like this 'nothing' is in effect
retroactive." 28 Put differently in one of his most famous quotes,

23. LEE SMOLIN, THE LIFE OF THE COSMOS 198 (1997) ("A universe made
according to a fundamental theory is then very like a universe made by a god, in that
it is made according to a rationality that exists prior to and independently of the actual
universe.").
BRIAN GREENE, THE FABRIC OF THE COSMOS: SPACE, TIME, AND THE
24.
TEXTURE OF REALITY 272 (2004) ("A common misconception is that the big bang

provides a theory of cosmic origins. It doesn't. The big bang is a theory . .. that
delineates a cosmic evolution from a split second after whatever happened to bring
the universe into existence, but it says nothing at all about time zero itself.").
25.

SMOLIN, supra note 23, at 199.

26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 198.

28.

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 16 (Hazel E. Barnes trans.,

Philosophical Library, Inc. 1956) (1943).
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"nothingness . . gets its being from being." 29 Applying this idea to the
present analysis, humans are constrained in understanding what might
transcend the existence of this universe by the idea that their
understanding is necessarily tied to their present existence.
Humans' constrained understanding finds further support in the
idea that scientific principles might not be absolute. This idea is present
in a centuries-long debate: whether mathematics - to use the famous
example by Kant, the proposition that 5 + 7 = 12 - is analytic or
synthetic. 30 Many would object to describing mathematics as anything
but a self-evident and universal idea, yet this itself is unsettled for the
same reasons that Smolin has identified. The same doubt is present with
respect to the laws of physics. As Greene has stated, "The laws of
physics didn't ,have to operate this way. ... [W]e can imagine a
universe in which the laws of physics with which we are familiar tell us
nothing about the laws of physics on . . . the other side of the

universe." 31
The possibility that physical laws could be variable will be explored
in greater depth later in this Article, in its discussion of multiverses, a
theory that allows for the idea precisely that there are variable laws
throughout spacetime. For the purposes of discussion, it is sufficient to
note that whether variable laws in the universe exist or not, the presence
of empiricism, even in science, does not abrogate uncertainty.
Building on the idea that empiricism cannot eliminate meaningful
uncertainty, this Article will further explore how aspects of modem
science illuminate the epistemological leaps that must be taken in
science versus religious faith. It explores how uncertainty is part and
parcel of much of modem science, and how such uncertainty tests the
limits of even scientifically driven empiricism.
29. Id.
30. IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS 21-22
(Gary Hatfield ed. & trans., Cambridge University Press 2004) (1783); see also
GREENE, supra note 13, at 296-97 ("Mathematical knowledge is the literary output of
humans conversant in the unusually precise language of mathematics. And as is surely
the case with literature produced in one of the world's natural language, mathematical
literature is the product of human ingenuity and creativity. That's not to say that other
intelligent life forms wouldn't come upon the same mathematical results we've found;
they very well might. But that could easily reflect similarities in our experiences (such
as the need to count, the need to trade, the need to survey, and so on) and so would
provide minimal evidence that math has a transcendent existence.").
31. GREENE, supra note 24, at 222.
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II. QUANTUM AGE: UNCERTAINTY IN SCIENTIFIC EMPIRICISM
Several aspects of modem science - quantum mechanics, string
theory, and multiverse theory in particular - stretch the boundaries of
adherence to traditional scientific principles of empiricism. This Part
explores these fields.
A. Quantum Mechanics and Probabilityin Spacetime

Quantum mechanics has presented one of the most substantial
challenges to the traditional paradigms of science, in highlighting the
fundamental physical uncertainty of our observable universe, and thus
shedding light on the limits of empirical observation. At its essence,
quantum mechanics hypothesizes uncertainty at the core of the
universe's building blocks. It posits that each constituent particle of the
universe, like an electron, is not merely a point in spacetime, but also
has a wave-like property - a probability wave - that is spread
throughout the entire universe. 32 This property entails that a particle's
33
location is certain only at the time it is measured. Even with this
knowledge, one cannot be certain where the particle could have been
before, or will be after the time of measurement; the location can only
be described by probabilities, which themselves are subject to
interference. 34 As Greene succinctly states, "it is not that the electron
(or any particle for that matter) really was located at only one of these
35
possible positions, but we simply don't know which." Instead, "there
32. Id. at 90; see also id. at 86-87 (describing the initial experimental origins of
the theory, which showed that individual electrons, moving separately and
independently from one another, can "build up the interference pattern characteristic
of waves").
33. Id. at 94 ("It's not that the electron has a position and that we don't know
the position before we do our measurement. Rather, contrary to what you'd expect,
the electron simply does not have a definite position before the. measurement is
taken."); see also id. at 82 ("[A] particle can hang in a state of limbo between having
one or another particular property - like an alien sphere hovering between flashing
red and flashing blue before the door to its box is opened - and only when the particle
is looked at (measured) does it randomly commit to one definite property or
another.").

34. Id. at 98 ("Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum
mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement.").
35. Id. at 178-79.
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is a sense in which the electron was at all of the locations, because each
of the possibilities - each of the possible histories - contributes to what

we now observe." 36
There are also limitations on what can be learned even at the
moment the particle is measured. First, even when the same particle is
measured with the exact same setup and initial conditions, its
probability wave may nevertheless give rise to different
measurements. 37 Second, when a particle is measured, the experiment
is necessarily contaminated because the measurement disrupts the
speed of the particle. Therefore, it is universally impossible to know, at
any given moment, both the position and speed of the particle. 38
These ideas may seem literally incredible to some. No less of a
person than Einstein himself, no ordinary mortal or scientist, was
consistently resistant to them. Einstein believed that particles possessed
definite values. 39 However, experimentation, time and again, has
validated these ideas. 40 To prove that particles have definite values,
Einstein and his colleagues attempted to show that particles, separated
by distances that even light cannot travel instantaneously, do not affect
one another. 41 Yet, experimentation has consistently shown that even
these particles are, in fact, somehow interconnected. 42 These results cast
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 90 ("If quantum mechanics is right, the number of times we find the

electron at a given point should be proportional to the size . . . , at that point, of the

-

probability wave we calculated.").
38. Id. at 97 (explaining how light required to measure the position of an
electron will change the motion of that electron); see also id. at 79 ("We can't ever
know the exact location and exact velocity of even a single particle.").
39. GREENE, supra note 24, at 121 ("Einstein's was also a universe in which
objects possess definite values of all possible physical attributes.").
40. Id. at 90, 121.
41. Id. at 101 (explaining how Einstein and his colleagues Boris Podolsky and
Nathan Rosen "sought to exploit these relationships to show that each of the particles
actually has a definite position and a definite velocity at every given instant of time.").
42. Id. at 80 ("[T]hese results, coming from both theoretical and experimental
considerations, strongly support the conclusion that the universe admits
interconnections that are not local. Something that happens over here can be entwined
with something that happens over there even if nothing travels from here to there
and even if there isn't enough time for anything, even light, to travel between the
events."); see also id. at 114 ("Entangled particles, even though spatially separate, do
not operate autonomously.").
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serious doubt on the claim that particles have definite values, and
supports the claim that a particle can have wave-like properties that
pervade the entire universe. 43 Scientists have quite recently conducted
experiments confirming that atoms take a particular type of path,
whether particle-like or wave-like, only after having been measured,
before which the atom cannot be considered to have either such
property. 44
It is important to note: despite the lack of direct observability of
things like probability waves, the theory of quantum mechanics is
backed not only by rigorous math, but also a great deal of experimental
science that has consistently confirmed its predictions. 45 Still, the
phenomena described by quantum mechanics - particularly the
uncertainty of the particles of nature - give us much to think about,
particularly with respect to the nature of empirical observation itself.
One question it raises is whether human consciousness is necessary
in essence to bring particles into existence. 46 Some have posited that it
43. Nevertheless, some have argued that waves are a human invention,
constituting a statistical theory that serves important scientific purposes in describing
our observations about the behavior of particles. See, e.g., VICTOR J. STENGER, GOD
AND THE FOLLY OF FAITH: THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION 155-160
(2012) (arguing that particles, not waves, are what science measures). Victor Stenger
argues that it is impossible to determine with complete certainty whether particles or
waves (or neither) are the ultimate reality, meaning that scientists should not be
making "grand metaphysical claims" about theories the purpose of which are simply
to describe our observations. Id. at 163. Metaphysical claims about reality aside, it is
nevertheless noteworthy that, within the realm of science that attempts to describe the
world, probability plays such an important role. The challenge, as this Article explores
later, is determining what level of improbability makes a particular theory
scientifically unsound. See infra Parts 1I-B, III. Quantum mechanics necessarily
destabilizes that analysis, even if it is true (albeit ultimately unobservable) that waves
are indeed only a human invention.
44. See A. G. Manning et al., Wheeler's Delayed-ChoiceGedanken Experiment
with a Single Atom, 11 NATURE PHYSICS 539, 539-42 (2015).
45. While the probability waves posited by quantum mechanics remain
completely and forever unobservable, the theory behind them gives rise not only to
predictions, but to predictions that succeed. GREENE, supra note 13, at 168.
46. GREENE, supra note 24, at 207 ("But why, a detractor asks, should
fundamental physics be so closely tied to human awareness? If we were not here to
observe the world, would wavefunctions never collapse, or, perhaps, would the very
concept of a wavefunction not exist?"); see also id. at 456 (opining that, while it is
unlikely that science will find the act of conscious observation an integral element of
quantum mechanics, there is no way yet of ruling this out).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol53/iss1/6

14

Lim: Epistemology in Uncertainty: Distinguishing Science and Faith in

14

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

is necessary - that if a tree falls and nobody hears it, it does not make a
sound, and that the moon is not there when people are not looking at it
- lending support to a strong version of the so-called Anthropic
Principle, which is the idea that the universe must have intelligent life
that is able to make observations about it.4 7 This is a viewpoint that has
long had proponents in philosophy, like George Berkeley, who argued
that existence cannot be without consciousness. 48
On the one hand, many scientists have rejected these ideas. Perhaps
reality itself fundamentally "exists" in probabilities; thus, it is not
necessary for any entity in the universe, human or otherwise, to locate
particles at a particular point before that particle can exist. This position
accords with the position taken by many scientists that aspects of
quantum mechanics speak not to what reality is (e.g., what properties
particles possess), but to how humans come to know about some aspects
of that reality (and not others). 49 Furthermore, even accepting that
reality can only exist when particles are located at definite points, many
scientists have pointed to the fact that humans themselves consist of
particles, raising the possibility that human consciousness is not
necessary for particles to be located at definite points.50 Such ideas align
47. See John Earman, The SAP Also Rises: A Critical Examination of the
Anthropic Principle,24 AMER. PHIL. Q. 307, 309 (1987).
48.

GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN

KNOWLEDGE 13 (David R. Wilkins eds., 2002) (1710) ("[T]here is not any other
substance than spirit, or that which perceives.?'). The relation between the conscious
mind and reality is even, according to philosopher Anselm, such that God must exist
in actuality, as a God that exists only in human consciousness would not be the
greatest thing conceivable - and since an imaginary God cannot be greater than an
existing one, God must exist. ST. ANSELM, Proslogium, in PROSLOGIUM;
MONOLOGIUM: AN APPENDIX IN BEHALF OF THE FOOL BY GAUNILO; AND CUR DEUS

HOMo (Sidney Norton Deane trans., The Open Court Publishing Co., 1926) (1078),
http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/anselm-proslogium.asp.
49. GREENE, supra note 24,,at 204-05 ("One approach, with historical roots that
go back to Heisenberg, is to abandon the view that wavefunctions are objective
features of quantum reality, and, instead, view them merely as an embodiment of what
we know about reality.").
50. Id. at 203 ("Yet, since there is no difference between the atoms, protons,
and electrons that make up the experimenter and the equipment he or she uses, and
the atoms, protons, and electrons that he or she studies, why in the world is there a
split in how quantum mechanics treats them? If quantum mechanics is a universal
theory that applies without limitations to everything, the observed and the observer
should be treated in exactly the same way.").
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with philosophical perspectives, such as that of Martin Heidegger, who
famously argued that people's subjective experiences are not at all
separate from their objective physical experiences." Rather, when a
person encounters something in the universe, this experience is a
52
manifestation of that something as one of its possibilities in space.
Regardless of whether quantum mechanics provides support for
such a strong version of the Anthropic Principle, there remain other
ways that the phenomena described by quantum mechanics show how
jumps in science must be, and actually are, taken. At a very general
level, the idea that particles consist, at least in part, of probability waves
that spread ubiquitously throughout the universe supports the idea that
neither space nor time can be fundamentally defined as linear.
But perhaps even more importantly, quantum mechanics establish
that particles are in waves rather than points, even though science
generally treats observation at the super-quantum level as solely
reducible to points. This is in large part because doing so has no
practical consequence to humans. In the absence of a theory that can
simultaneously capture what happens at both the smallest and largest
possible scales of the universe, physics has drawn a general distinction
between the quantum scale, the scale at which we typically view things
every day, and still larger scales. 53 For example, since we collectively
view the moon as existing in the same place, we tend to think that it
exists even if no human being is viewing it.
Still, we do not all view an object even so large as the moon as
existing in the exact same place. We do view it as existing in generally
the same place, but were we to make individual observations at the
quantum level, there would certainly be differences in where exactly
our minds interpret the moon. At the scale we typically view the moon,
those differences are fully inconsequential. But, at the quantum level

51. Heidegger argues that subject/object and consciousness-world distinctions
are secondary, in his famous concept of "Being-in-the-world." MARTIN HEDEGGER,
BEING AND TIME 78 (John MacQuarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962) (1927)
('Being-in-the-world' indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for
a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole.").
52. Id.
53. GREENE, supra note 24, at 329 (discussing the incompatibility traditionally
of quantum mechanics and general relativity).
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removed from the human utility-driven idea of what is important - these
differences exist.5 4

While the idea that two people can see the same moon in slightly
different locations seems irrelevant, it calls into question the very nature
of an absolute existence, even within our directly observable universe.
Similarly, the idea that, in both the past and the future, particles are in
a sense located at all of their possible locations necessarily applies at
scales larger than the quantum. 5 Therefore, it should be true that, even
at scales larger than the quantum, the moon has more than one definite
past.
The physical laws of time, accepted as governing the universe at
both the smallest and largest scales possible, further support the idea
that spacetime at all levels does not fundamentally consist of particles
located at absolute points. As a threshold matter it is useful to note that,
even though humans intuitively see time as flowing, the past, present,
and future all exist on equal terms, as a matter of science. 56 This makes
more sense when one considers that humans never sense things in the
present; because of the time, however little, it takes for outside particles
to reach our senses, everything we experience has, in fact, already
happened. 57 For the same reason that the present exists irrespective of
whether or not it has been illuminated for us,5 8 the past and future are

54. See GREENE, supra note 24, at 97 ("The uncertainty principle is completely
general: it applies to everything.").

55.

See id.

56. Id. at 132 ("Every part of the spacetime loaf . . exists on the same footing
as every other, suggesting, as Einstein believed, that reality embraces past, present,
and future equally and that the flow we envision bringing one section to light as
another goes dark is illusory.").
57. Id. at 133 ("A now-list - reality in this way of thinking - is a funny thing.
Nothing you see right now belongs on your now-list, because it takes time for light to
reach your eyes. Anything you see right now has already happened.").
58.
This idea is also supported by the concept of special relativity, which
describes how two different observers moving in relative motion can have different
conceptions of the present:
[S]pecial relativity tells a very different story.... Two observers in relative
motion have nows . .. that are different . . .. Observers moving relative to
each other have different conceptions of what exists at a given moment, and
hence they have different conceptions of reality." Id. at 133-34. "So, if you
buy the notion that reality consists of the things in your freeze-frame mental
image right now, and if you agree that your now is no more valid than the
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no less real even though they are no longer illuminated for us. 59 Put by
Greene, "Just as we envision all of space as really being out there, as
really existing, we should also envision all of time as really being out
there, as really existing." 60 Greene continues, "Under close scrutiny, the
flowing river of time more closely resembles a giant block of ice with
every moment forever frozen into place." 61
More to the point, time conceptually makes sense only because
there is homogeneity between all the parts of the universe, providing a
comparison point by which time can be measured in a meaningful
way. 62 This homogeneity manifests itself in uniform radiation that
originated with the Big Bang, and has continued to spread throughout
the universe's hundreds of millions of light years. 63 Without such a
comparison point, it becomes impossible to say which particular
configuration of particles comprising the universe belong to a particular
"present" moment in time of that universe. That time otherwise lacks

now of someone located far away in space who can move freely, then reality
encompasses all of the events in spacetime. The total loaf exists.

Id. at 138-39.
59. As Greene states:
By definition, moments don't include the passing of time - at least, not the
time we're aware of - because moments just are, they are the raw material
of time, they don't change. A particular moment can no more change in time
than a particular location in space; if a moment were to move, it would be a
different location in space; if a moment in time were to change, it would be
a different moment in time. The intuitive image of a projector light that
brings each new now to life just doesn't hold up to careful examination.
Instead, every moment is illuminated, and every moment remains
illuminated. Every moment is.
Id. at 140-41.
60. Id. at 139.
61. Id. at 140-41.
62. Id. at 236 ("It is this uniformity, this overall symmetry between one location
and another, that allows us to speak sensibly of time when describing the entire
universe.").
63. Id. at 228 ("The uniformity of radiation is thus a fossilized testament to the
uniformity of both the laws of physics and the details of the environment across the
cosmos.... If we take the measure of change to be a working definition of elapsed
time, the uniformity of conditions throughout space is evidence of the uniformity of
change throughout the cosmos, and thus implies the uniformity of elapsed time as
well.").
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meaning further supports a conception of spacetime where particles are
measured in probabilities.
Finally, the fundamental laws of physics make no distinction with
respect to direction in time - they apply equally whether moving
forwards or backwards. 64 Even the concept of entropy - that particles
tend to move towards disorder rather than order - theoretically applies
both backwards and forwards in time; the second law of
thermodynamics actually states that, at any given moment, a physical
system both will have and has had more entropy. 65 The reality is that
the Big Bang initiated our universe in a state of exceptionally low
entropy, which is how time acquired a meaningful "directional arrow"
in our universe. 66 Yet, even this cannot discount the theoretical
possibility, however miniscule, that particles might reverse course.
This, in turn, supports the assertion that the past and future locations of
any given particle are best treated as probabilities.
Despite the foregoing, in hypothesizing about phenomena at a scale
larger than quantum, science generally reduces its observations to
absolute and definite points. Some scientists go even further by
attempting to use quantum mechanical principles directly to make
conclusions about larger scales in the universe. But in so doing, they
lose sight of the principle that particles may fundamentally exist in
probabilities. An example is when scientists use quantum mechanics to
argue that the universe is deterministic and, thus, that free will does not
exist. Quantum mechanics has its basis in an equation by Erwin
Schrodinger, which shows that knowing the shape of a particle's
probability wave at any one time allows one to determine the particle's

64. Id. at 13 ("Each direction in time, forward and backward, is treated by the
laws without distinction.... Nothing in the equations of fundamental physics shows
any sign of treating one direction in time differently from the other, and that is totally
at odds with everything we experience.").
65. Id. at 160 ("A common misconception is that if, according to the second
law of thermodynamics, entropy increases toward the future, then entropy necessarily
decreases toward the past.").
66. Id. at 174 ("The egg splatters rather than unsplatters because it is carrying
forward the drive toward higher entropy that was initiated by the extraordinarily low
entropy state with which the universe began. Incredible order at the beginning is what
started it all off, and we have been living through the gradual unfolding toward higher
disorder ever since.").
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probability wave for any other time, both past and future. 67 This aspect
of quantum mechanics is certainly deterministic. There remains the
possibility that the very process of humans observing a particle at a
particular location, at any given time, is itself non-deterministic. But
this possibility hinges on the earlier question of whether human
consciousness is vital to that particle's existence - h question that many
scientists have declined to answer in the affirmative. 68 Based on this,
some will conclude that human behavior itself is deterministic.
Nonetheless, this method of arguing determinism over nondeterminism, focusing on a linear path of human behavior, misses the
larger point: existence itself may be of probabilities, rather than
absolutes. The idea that knowing a probability wave at one time means
knowing it at all past and future times is as linear as the idea that humans
alone make their own choices to act. Quantum mechanics introduces
principles the power of which exists precisely in their non-linearity.
To be clear, the principles of quantum mechanics do not suggest we
should change any conclusions drawn from observation and
experimentation at any scale larger than the quantum. While there is a
theoretical probability that a large object could exist elsewhere than we
think it does, this probability is so exponentially miniscule it does not
affect our daily observations. And parsimony is also a hallmark of
science. 69 At the same time, if quantum mechanics is to be believed,
reality must consist not of absolute points (even absolute points of
which we can have only probable knowledge), but of probability itself.
In a fundamental way, then, treating observations as absolute points,
even for practical reasons, amounts to taking a step that is not
mathematically required. Thus, treating observations as absolute points
amounts to taking a justified, but still meaningful, jump.7 0
67.

Id. at 200 ("Ifthe probability wave is associated with a particle, such as an

electron, you can use it to predict the probability that, at any specified time, an
experiment will find the electron at any specified location."); see also id. at 456
(explaining how this theory, barring any yet-discovered aspect of quantum mechanics,
forecloses human free will).
68. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
69. As Greene states, "You do not worry that the atomic constituents of the air
you are now breathing will suddenly disband .... And you are right not to fret about
this outcome, because according to quantum mechanics the probability of its
happening, while not zero, is absolutely small." GREENE, supra note 24, at 92.
70. Observations at this supraquantum level may have an exponentially high
likelihood of being accurate. However, this is subject to the idea that particles, at the
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Ultimately, these ideas must call into question what human
empiricism itself can ever definitively prove about reality in our
universe. In this way, the same question that has plagued philosophers
about mathematics, that is whether it is analytic or synthetic, arises here,
too. The very nature of science means the discipline only cares about
what humans are able to observe empirically, directly or indirectly.
Along those same lines, some scientists simply do not care about
whether quantum mechanics speaks to the nature of reality itself, so
long as it makes accurate predictions about what human beings are able
to observe.7 1 Yet, what the field of quantum mechanics has shown still
stands: that any conclusion reached by human observation - including
conclusions about the parts of our physical universe that we can directly
observe - is necessarily limited, even with the strictest adherence to
scientific principles. What is testable, falsifiable, and ultimately
predictable is based on the human conscious experience. Calling to
mind what the Anthropic Principle in its most modest version states, in
the words of physicist Brandon Carter: "We must be prepared to take
account of the fact that our location in the universe is necessarily
privileged to the extent of being compatible with our existence as
observers." 72 This version does not argue that the universe must have
been designed for entities capable of observation, as the strong version
does. Instead, it argues that what we can know about the universe is
constrained by the very ability of entities to observe.
B. String Theory
It is easy to see how the rise of quantum mechanics in the 2 0 th
century could have enlivened debate on the precise degree to which
empiricism matters in scientific inquiry. Arguably, however, science
smallest levels (and therefore any higher levels), fundamentally exist in waves. See
supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. It is also subject to the idea, explored later,
that observations at the grandest of scales - i.e., observations beyond our present
universe - defy such confidence in their accuracy. See infra notes 88-92 and
accompanying text (regarding multiverses).
71. GREENE, supra note 13, at 236. Greene goes on to disagree, stating that
"physical theories need to be mathematically coherent" and that "[t]here's a difference
between making predictions and understandingthem." Id. at 236-37.
72. Brandon Carter, The Anthropic Principleand Large Number Coincidences,
in CONFRONTATION OF COSMOLOGICAL THEORIES WITH OBSERVATION 291, 293

(Malcolm S. Longair ed., 1974).
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has only recently reached the zenith of this debate - in particular, after
the development of ideas that built on quantum mechanics, specifically
string theory which conjectures that constituent particles of the universe
are not points but one-dimensional strings. This theory was introduced
precisely to reconcile quantum mechanics with the traditional theory of
gravity - that is, to capture what happens at both the smallest and largest
possible scales of the universe all under the same theoretical umbrella.
The challenge with string theory: though introduced for an
important theoretical reason, no empirical confirmation for it has yet
been found. Philosopher of science Richard Dawid explains in his 2013
book, String Theory and the Scientific Method, "The basic idea of string
theory is a fairly simple one: the point-like elementary particles of
traditional particle theories are replaced by one-dimensional strings." 73
However, the very introduction of these particles "is chosen for entirely
theoretical reasons, in order to provide a coherent unification of the
particle physics research program with gravity" - the very endeavor that
science has not yet achieved. 74 "So far, no immediate empirical
signatures of the extendedness of elementary objects have been
observed." 75 Instead, "Four decades of intense work on the theory ...
have not resulted in the construction of a complete theory.

...

No real

breakthrough has been achieved that would allow specific quantitative
calculations of observables from the fundamental principles of string
theory." 76
Rather than rejecting string theory as unscientific, however, Dawid
makes a radical argument, igniting a current predicament in the
philosophy of science: it is science itselfthat needs to adapt, specifically
to recognize the validity of what he calls "non-empirical theory
confirmation." 77 As he states:
In the new context of particle physics, the exclusive focus of the
philosophy of science on empirically confirmed theories does not
seem satisfactory any more. Once theories tend to remain empirically
unconfirmed for the whole range of a physicist's active career .. . it

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

RICHARD DAWID, STRING THEORY AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 10

(2013).

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 72.
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becomes increasingly important to assess the theory's status already
in its empirically unconfirmed state. 78

'

Such confirmation is based on three main factors:
1) the absence (or existence) of alternative solutions to a
particular problem ("string theorists tend to believe that
their theory is the only viable option for constructing a
unified theory of elementary particle interactions and
gravity"); 79
2) the degree to which the theory is connected to alreadyconfirmed theories ("string theorists view their own
endeavor as a natural continuation of the successful particle
physics research program.");8 0 and
3) the number of unexpected insights to which the theory gives
rise ("[o]nce the basic postulate of string physics has been
stated, one observes a long sequence of unexpected deeper
explanations of seemingly unconnected facts or theoretical
concepts"). 8
According to Dawid, the greater the degree to which these factors exist,
the greater the confidence we might have in a theory - even if the theory
has no empirical confirmation (or, because of fundamental constraints
to our ability to observe, may never be confirmed empirically). 82
What Dawid urges is a move away from empirical falsifiability as
the hallmark of science, a concept that the quintessential philosopher of
science, Karl Popper, shepherded into general acceptance. 83 Offering a
variety of factors for assessing the scientific validity of theories in the
absence of falsifiability, Dawid attempts to move science towards a
Bayesian model that defines probability not as "how frequently does

78.
79.
80.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 36. Dawid continues: "The fact that the standard model theory was at

the end impressively confirmed by experiment conveys a specific message to particle
physicists: if you knock on all doors you can think of and precisely one of them opens,
the chances are good that you are on the right track." Id.

81.
82.

Id.at33.
Id. at 58.

83. Sean O'Connor, The Supreme Court'sPhilosophy ofScience: Will the Real
Karl Popper Please Stand Up, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 263, 263 (1995). See generally
KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959).
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something occur?" but as "what degree of belief should we have in our
knowledge?" As Dawid states, "What the classical scientific paradigm
unequivocally denies is the possibility that a process of rational analysis
on its own can offer an alternative strategy to empirical testing for
turning a scientific hypothesis into a well-established and well-trusted
theory." 84 Dawid concludes that, though "[t]he status of a merely nonempirically confirmed theory will always differ from the status of an
empirically well-tested one[,]. . . this difference in status should not be

seen as a wide rigid chasm, but rather as a gap of variable and reducible
85
width depending on the quality of the web of theoretical arguments."
Dawid's defense of string theory generated a storm of debate,
particularly on the heels of a piece in Nature magazine by physicists
George Ellis and Joe Silk, who criticized Dawid's argument. Ellis and
Silk urged scientists and philosophers of science to adopt a different
approach to determine what is and is not science. "In our view, the issue
boils down to clarifying one question: what potential observational or
experimental evidence is there that would persuade you that the theory
is wrong and lead you to abandoning it? If there is none, it is not a
scientific theory." 86 But others criticized Ellis and Silk, dubbing them
"the falsifiability police." 87
It is not the aim of this Article to take a position on this debate.
Rather, this Article discusses this debate as a means of reasserting its
central point: that modern science raises questions about empiricism as
the hallmark of science. In turn, then, this debate may also cast doubt
on how faith is distinguished from science - including in the eyes of the
law. The inevitable question, which this Article reserves for Part III,
then is: does "non-empirical theory confirmation" lend the imprimatur
of science to faith, blurring the distinction between science and faith?

84. DAWID, supra note 73, at 42.
85. Id. at 154.
86. George Ellis & Joe Silk, Scientific Method: Defend the Integrity ofPhysics,
NATURE (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/scientific-method-defend-theintegrity-of-physics- 1.16535.
Sean Carroll (@seanmcarroll), TWITTER (Dec. 17, 2014, 6:15 PM),
87.
454
01851651190785.
http://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/5
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C. Multiverses and Human Consciousness
This section will briefly explore other arenas of science, to see how
they support the ideas discussed in the previous section. In particular, it
will explore two modem theories: multiverse theory and the theory of
human consciousness. While each of these subjects is worthy of
intensive exploration its own right, this section has a much narrower
ambition: to show how the very nature of these fields underscores the
uncertainties not merely in the fundamental nature of existence, but also
in the very process of science itself. Thus, these fields, too, call into
question the ability of humans to draw conclusions from observation.
The idea of multiverses - that there is a set of potentially infinite
universes, not limited to our own - surely underscores uncertainty. This
is easy enough to see from what this idea specifically proposes about
the nature of existence. One interpretation of multiverses, utilizing
quantum mechanics, proposes that the probability wave of particles is
actualized into every possible outcome, each in its own universe.8 8
Another interpretation proposes that there are only a finite number of
particle arrangements, resulting in parallel universes, 89 including
universes that have intelligent life like ours. 90 Yet another interpretation
proposes that physical processes actually take place on a faraway twodimensional surface, which in turn projects a three-dimensional
hologram that comprises our daily experience of life. 9 1 And still another

88. This approach argues that probability waves of particles do not collapse
when they are measured at a particular location in the present. Instead, "each and
every potential outcome embodied in a wavefunction sees the light of day; the daylight
each sees, however, streams through its own separate universe." GREENE, supra note

24, at 205.
89. This approach argues that there is a limit to how much matter and energy
can fit into a region of space of a given size; otherwise, it will collapse into a black
hole. Because of there, there are a finite number ofparticles, as well as a finite number
of locations and speeds, and ultimately a finite number of arrangements of those
particles. GREENE, supra note 13, at 32.
90. Id. at 177 ("[M]ore galaxies means more planetary systems and hence the
underlying assumption goes a greater likelihood of life, intelligent life in particular.").
91. GREENE, supra note 24, at 482. This string theory-based approach arises
from the idea that the maximum entropy of any given region of space is contingent
not with the volume of that region, but with its surface area. Id.
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interpretation argues that all possible universes exist, supporting the
idea that there is no single theory that can describe the entire universe. 92
Not surprisingly, these theories have incited doubt in the scientific
community, not only with respect to whether these theories are
supportable, but also with respect to whether they are even scientific
particularly given that they speak fundamentally to things that human
beings will never be able to observe, and in many respects seem
unfalsifiable. However, such theories also have backers within the
scientific community. Those scientists argue that, though the
connection between direct observation and what multiverse theories
propose may be less direct, there is a sufficiently firm connection
between empirical observation and theory to justify calling these
theories science. 93 These proponents argue that multiverse theories may
have a tight enough structure, and make predictions - however yet
unproven - that are testable. 94
As with the non-empirical theory confirmation of string theory, this
Article does not seek to weigh in on the debate over whether multiverse
theories qualify as scientific. Rather, this Article discusses multiverses
to show how they necessarily question our assumptions about how to
draw conclusions from our own observations, including conclusions
about the very nature of our universe. This is certainly true to the extent
that any particular theory of multiverses raises doubt about the universe
having defined and linear, rather than probabilistic, properties. But it
also true to the extent that the very study of multiverses is not
thoroughly discounted as science, even though these theories manifest
a greater degree of attenuation between empiricism and conclusions
than science traditionally has allowed.

92. GREENE, supra note 13, at 294-95 (describing the "Ultimate Multiverse"
theory).
93. Id. at 165 ("Proponents counter that although the manner in which a given
multiverse connects with observation may be different from what were used to - it
may be more indirect, it may be less explicit, it may require fortune to shine favorably
on future experiments - in respectable proposals, such connections are not
fundamentally absent.").
94. Id. at 175 (identifying the argument that "the capacity to make predictions
emerges from the multiverse evincing an underlying mathematical pattern: physical
properties are distributed across the constituent universes in a sharply skewed or
highly correlated manner").
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Richard Dawkins, the famous scientist and atheist, has stated that
the key difference between the "genuinely extravagant God hypothesis"
and the "apparently extravagant multiverse hypothesis is one of
statistical improbability." 95 "The multiverse may seem extravagant in
sheer number of universes. But if each one of those universes is simple
in its fundamental laws, we are still not postulating anything highly
improbable." 96 He is undoubtedly right that the parsimony of the theory
contributes to its probability. At the same time, to the extent that
multiverses will always be unobservable, the argument necessarily
remains one of probability.97 The challenge is determining what degree
of probability we will accept to conclude that a particular theory is
scientifically sound. To the extent that multiverses, while not as
improbable as God, are arguably still improbable, this fact exemplifies
the difficulty of attempting to demarcate along these lines. And this
difficulty is manifested precisely in the fierce debate over the scientific
validity of these theories.
The exact same points apply to the subject of consciousness,
particularly human consciousness. First, the limits to the capacities of
human consciousness underscore the probabilistic nature of particles.
Consider, for example, our inability to see ambiguous, or reversible
images simultaneously. 98 If we are to accept the particular theory of
quantum mechanics that posits that human observation is what brings
things into existence, then such limits to human consciousness very
much affect existence itself.99 But even if we reject this theory, this
inability still complements quantum mechanical principles
particularly the principle that particles have possibilities that all exist
until, and only while, the particles are measured. As Daniel Dennett
posits in his theory of consciousness, consciousness does not consist of
95. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION 146-47 (2006).

9 6. Id.
97. Dawkins' argument also has a caveat:

"The multiverse may seem

extravagant in sheer number of universes. But if each one of those universes is simple
in its fundamental laws, we. are still not.postulating anything highly improbable." Id.
at 147.
98. See generally Melinda S. Jensen & Kyle E. Mathewson, Simultaneous
Perception of Both Interpretations of Ambiguous Figures, 40 PERCEPTION 1009
(2011); Deborah Chambers & Daniel Reisberg, Can Mental Images Be Ambiguous?,
11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 317 (1985).
99. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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a single view that arises after having been rubber-stamped by some
definitive central processing unit; rather, "[d]ifferent parts of the neural
00
processing assert more or less control at different times."
Second, consciousness in general, but particularly human
consciousness, remains as great a scientific mystery as does the origin
of the universe. While some aspects of consciousness can certainly be
explained, self-consciousness in particular is still a mystery. While
dualism in the vein of Rene Descartes - the idea that the mind and body
are separate - has long fallen out of favor, at least in the scientific
community,101 the task of explaining consciousness from a purely
physical or biological viewpoint remains unfulfilled, and everdaunting. How can human beings' thoughts or ideas be captured solely
by physical particles and processes? Science has barely begun to
unravel consciousness, or present a theory that is as tightly constructed
as theories explaining both much larger (i.e., the universe itself) and
much smaller things (i.e., quantum particles), notwithstanding whatever
gaps remain in even those theories.
However, even though we are far from being able to explain how
exactly consciousness works, many believe that it is reducible to
physical particles and processes.1 02 From a scientific perspective, this
DANIEL C. DENNETr, CoNscIousNEss EXPLAINED 253-54 (1991)
of
such a single stream [of consciousness] (however wide), there are
("Instead
100.

multiple channels in which specialist circuits try, in parallel pandemoniums, to do

their various things, creating Multiple Drafts as they go. Most of these fragmentary
drafts of 'narrative' play short-lived roles in the modulation of current activity but
some get promoted to further functional roles, in swift succession, by the activity of a
virtual machine in the brain.").
101. See, e.g., id. at 37 ("This fundamentally antiscientific stance of dualism is,
to my mind, its most disqualifying feature, and is the reason why in this book I adopt
the apparently dogmatic rule that dualism is to be avoided at all costs. It is not that I
think I can give a knock-down proof that dualism, in all its forms, is false or
incoherent, but that, given the way that dualism wallows in mystery, accepting
dualism is giving up.").
102. See Athena Demertzi et al., Dualism Persistsin the Science ofMind, 1157
ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 1, 1 (2009) (discussing conflicting attitudes on dualism among
people in scientific fields surveyed on the subject). Nonetheless, that consciousness is
not reducible to one place in the brain, in an interesting way, arguably is
complemented by - and ultimately complements in turn - the ideas of uncertainty in
quantum mechanics. Though there cannot be empirical evidence for this proposition,
one could argue that this connection - particularly to the extent that quantum
mechanics supports ideas like many-world multiverses - supports the idea of dualism,
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is absolutely justifiable: such a theory yields testable predictions, unlike
a theory of dualism. A dualist's mind is to a human as God is to the
universe. Still, that this theory is given credence again underscores how
substantial, though justified jumps are taken even in science.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
SCIENCE AND FAITH

In the realm of science, there is much room for uncertainty, for
outright unverifiable propositions, and for the absence of direct,
absolute proof. This room provides some justification for human beings
to question the place of other things in the world that have these same
qualities - whether those things are traditionally considered scientific
or not.
Thus, the very question posed at the beginning of this Article
returns: how, then, to distinguish science from non-sciences,
particularly in eyes of the law? In the light of advancements and debates
within modem science, this Article sees the approach of Larry Laudan
as providing some useful principles for this legal demarcation. An
approach rejecting a wholesale determination of whether an entire
theory qualifies as "scientific," this Article argues, is less preferable in
scrutinizing faith-based attempts at scientific legitimacy than an
approach that attempts to ascertain religious purpose. This method may,
to the extent that it posits that there is a plane which cannot be observed. See supra
notes 88-92 and accompanying text. In addition, there is no evidence that
consciousness is necessary for particles to become located at a definite point. See
supra note 46 and accompanying text. That said, that even consciousness itself cannot
be located at any particular point suggests that uncertainty pervades even when
particles are considered to have a definite location. In the midst of such uncertainty,
some indeed might choose to believe in a more dualist account, without being
completely absent logic, albeit in a manner that should not be proclaimed scientific.
Put differently, whether or not human consciousness is or is not necessary, in quantum
mechanics, for there to be a definite reality, in conditions of uncertainty it is not
wholly absent epistemic logic to believe so. Cf Marcus Arvan, A New Theory ofFree
Will, 44 PHIL. F. 1 (2013) (arguing that philosophical and scientific hypotheses,
including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and
eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy, together imply a theory of free
will). To be clear then, the argument is that dualism exists not on the basis there is no
scientific explanation - a God-of-the-gaps type of argument - but on the basis, which
may be reasonable to believe even without a complete scientific explanation, that
these scientific phenomena support their possibility.
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consistent with the approach of Laudan, involve a more nuanced
analysis of an alleged theory's many constituent parts, in order to smoke
out such religious purpose.
A. Laudan, His Critics, and a Middle Ground
To understand why this approach is preferable, it is necessary to
explore further the science-religion demarcation debate in the wake of
the McLean case. The decision triggered not only the response from
Laudan, but also both a great deal of criticism of Laudan's approach, 103
as well as support from those who agreed with Laudan that the
philosophy of science behind McLean was imperfect. 104 Along these
lines, as philosopher of science Maarten Boudry argues, while it is
"right to champion empirical boldness as a cardinal scientific virtue,"
nevertheless "[a] theory is not falsifiable until it is conjoined with
and auxiliary
background
assumptions, initial conditions,
hypotheses." 10 5 Thus, "[d]epending on how we interpret Popper's
logical criterion in light of these problems, . . . [the criterion of

falsifiability] is either too restrictive, classifying some of our best
theories as nonscientific, or too permissive, allowing some of the worst
theories in currency (e.g., astrology) to be recognized as science."
103.

106

See, e.g., Michael Ruse, Pro Judice, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE? THE

PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION IN THE CREATION/EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY 337, 337

(Robert T. Pennock & Michael Ruse eds., 2009).
104.

See, e.g., Stephen C. Meyer, The DemarcationofScience and Religion, in

18,22 (Gary B.
Femgren ed., 2000) (stating that the demarcation criteria used as a basis for McLean
"have proven problematic, especially as applied to the debate about biological
origins").
105. Maarten Boudry, Loki's Wager and Laudan's Error: On Genuine and
THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION

TerritorialDemarcation, in PHILOSOPHY OF PSEUDOSCIENCE: RECONSIDERING THE
DEMARCATION PROBLEM 79, 87 (Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry eds., 2013).

As Ladyman also argues, in agreement with Laudan, testability and falsifiability are
weak requirements. James Ladyman, Toward a Demarcation of Science from
Pseudoscience,

in

PHILOSOPHY

OF

PSEUDOSCIENCE:

RECONSIDERING

THE

DEMARCATION PROBLEM 45, 54 (Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry eds., 2013).

For example, "the requirement of testability or falsifiability is too strong, at least when
applied to individual propositions, because high-level scientific hypotheses have no
direct empirical consequences. Hence, there are many scientific statements that are
not falsifiable, or at least not directly." Id.
106. Boudry, supra note 105, at 87.
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Ultimately, some, like Boudry, have argued that both approaches are
imperfect, and, to that end, attempted to propose alternate demarcation
criteria that would account for the problems posed by both. 0 7
Despite advances in this debate in the wake of McLean, a
fundamental problem is unavoidable with any demarcation criteria. As
philosopher Sven Ove Hannson has argued, there are two basic types of
demarcation criteria, which are necessarily exclusive of one another:
general and specific. 08 General and timeless demarcation principles are
attractive for obvious reasons. 109 However, they "cannot then provide
us with concrete criteria for the evaluation of specific investigations,
statements, or theories. Such criteria will have to refer to
methodological particulars that differ between subject areas and change
with the passage of time.""l 0
Examples of general principles for demarcation include those that
can be used to disqualify theories as scientific based, not on the
probability of any specific content, but on their more global
commitments. For example, theories that contend that only some people
have special ability to determine truth or falsehood, and theories that
flat out reject being tested, should be ruled out by these principles."'
These principles should also rule out theories that reject the concept of
methodological naturalism - the idea that science cannot appeal to
supernatural interventions to explain processes.11 2 A manifestation of
this idea is the so-called God-of-the-gaps argument: that unexplainable
phenomenon can be explained by appeal to God.113
107.

See generally PHILOSOPHY OF PSEUDOSCIENCE: RECONSIDERING THE

DEMARCATION PROBLEM, supra note 105.
108. Sven Ove Hansson, Defining Pseudoscienceand Science, in PHILOSOPHY
OF PSEUDOSCIENCE: RECONSIDERING THE DEMARCATION PROBLEM, supra note 105,

at 74-75.

109.

Id.

110.

Id at 74.

111.

Id. at 72-73.

112. Cf Robert T. Pennock, Can't Philosophers Tell the Difference between
Science and Religion? Demarcation Revisited, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE? THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION IN THE CREATION/EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY, supra note

103, at 545 (arguing for the adoption of methodological naturalism).
113.
See generally Matthew J. Brauer et al., Is It Science Yet? Intelligent
Design, Creationism, and the Constitution, in BUT IS IT SCIENCE? THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION IN THE CREATION/EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY, supra note

103, at 427.
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Such criteria could disqualify ideas like creation science or
intelligent design. Manifesting their lack of good faith commitment to
scientific principles, such theories simultaneously argue that
demarcating science is impossible, yet cite to some of its criteria to
argue that creationism or intelligent design is, indeed, scientific.114
Pseudoscience, broadly defined by some, is precisely scientific pretense
- for example, as Boudry argues, intelligent design theorists "refuse to
flesh out their design hypothesis and use convenient immunizations that
make the theory impervious to criticism."11 5 Put more bluntly by
another philosopher of science, James Ladyman, pseudoscience
"resist[s] refutation by not making definite claims at all. They
progressively disconnect us from the truth in a way that is more
insidious than lying, for we may end up not just with false beliefs but
with no beliefs at all." 1 16
Yet, this does not dispose of the need for more specific demarcation
criteria to deal with other claims. As Boudry further argues,
methodological naturalism "fuels the common misconception that only
'science' possesses epistemic authority, whereas metaphysical
questions, traditionally the trade of philosophers, are a matter of idle
speculation only, which, interesting though it may be, can be safely
ignored in scientific matters."117 To this end, as biologist Martin
Mahner argues, not only is there a distinction between pseudoscience
as defined above and simply bad science, which at least is committed
in good faith to scientific principles,"1 8 but also not everything non114.

Id.

115. See Boudry, supra note 105, at 86.
116. See Ladyman, supra note 105, at 53.
117. See Boudry, supra note 105, at 85. As he further argues:
Given that the very concept of the supernatural is notoriously shaky, it is ill

advised to erect any form of demarcation on its shoulders. To give substance
to such a territorial demarcation claim, one needs to come up with a
coherent and nontrivial definition of natural versus supernatural that does
not already presuppose the demarcation between science and non- science.
Id. To wit, he criticizes those who "simply equate[] testability and naturalness and
leaves us with a circular and self-serving definition of supernatural as that which is
beyond scientific investigation by definition." Id.
118. Martin Mahner, Science and Pseudoscience:How to Demarcateafter the
(Alleged) Demise of the DemarcationProblem, in PHILOSOPHY OF PSEUDOSCIENCE:
RECONSIDERING THE DEMARCATION PROBLEM, supra note 105, at 31 ("A scientist

who follows a sloppy and careless experimental protocol, or who even omits a few
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scientific is pseudoscientific: "Ordinary knowledge as well as the arts
and humanities are not sciences, yet they are not pseudosciences."ll 9
And as Hansson points out, "the sciences and the humanities have
something important in common: their very raison d'6tre is to provide
us with the most epistemically warrantedstatements that can be made,
at the time being, on the subject matter within their respective
domains." 20
As Boudry has argued, "because we have grown weary of
creationist hypotheses that, when push comes to shove, boil down to
'God did it and his ways are mysterious,' we can hardly imagine any
other supernatural hypothesis to be viable." 21 But "even if all current
theories with property X happen to be pseudoscientific, this does not
mean that talk of X is off limits."

22

This argument is only emphasized

by advancements in science that have no trace of religion as we
traditionally conceive it, but nevertheless come closer to the line of
pseudoscience. On the one hand, a lack of honest commitment to the
principles of science should be fatal to a theory, as far as considering it
science. On the other hand, honest commitment to those principles is
not automatically less fatal - for example, a theory that is committed to

data from his report to obtain 'smoother' graphs and results (which borders on
scientific fraud), is a bad scientist but not (yet) a pseudoscientist.").
119. Id.
120. See Hansson, supra note 108, at 63 (emphasis added). Hansson argues:
Together they form a community of knowledge disciplines characterized by
mutual respect for each other's results and methods.... An archaeologist
or a historian will have to accept the outcome of a state-of-the art chemical
analysis of an archaeological artifact. In the same way, a zoologist will have
to accept the historians' judgments on the reliability of an ancient text
describing extinct animals. To understand ancient descriptions of diseases,
we need cooperation between classical scholars and medical scientists - not
between classical scholars and homeopaths or between medical scientists
and bibliomancers... . Science in a broad sense seeks knowledge about
nature (natural science), about ourselves (psychology and medicine), about
our societies (social science and history), about our physical constructions
(technological science), and about our thought constructions (linguistics,
literary studies, mathematics, and philosophy). (Philosophy, of course, is a
science in this broad sense of the word .

...

Id. at 63-64.
121. See Boudry, supra note 105, at 94.
122. Id.
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empiricism, but is either methodologically flawed or in the end
falsified.
For this reason, he concludes:
The appropriate way of dealing with a supernaturalist pseudoscience
like ID creationism is not to relegate it to a domain where science
has no authority, but to confront the conceptual and empirical
problems of the theory head on. In that respect, Laudan is completely
on the mark when he writes that "our focus should be squarely on the
123
empirical and conceptual credentials for claims about the world."

At the same time, he argues that Laudan fails by reducing the problem
to evaluating specific claims per se, which: is distinguishable from
proposing more specific demarcation criteria to evaluate specific
methodologies.124 In particular: "But Laudan (as well as Popper) was
wide of the mark when he reduced the demarcation job to evaluating
the propositional content of the theory.... Pseudoscience is too messy
to be analyzed on the level of the theory-in-itself, and demarcationists
25
need more refined instruments of analysis."
B. CraftingA Legal Approach
It is clear, then, that Laudan's approach, while recognizing the
limits of general demarcation principles, does not sufficiently address
the problem. However, Laudan's approach still has much to
recommend to it, particularly with respect to how legal demarcations
between religion and faith should proceed. On the one hand, one could
argue: how can something like creation science be deemed to violate
the Establishment Clause if it is not, on the whole, deemed as
123. Id. He further states:
Although I have argued that Laudan is wrong and that the normative
demarcation problem is tractable, this does not mean no borderline cases
exist. In particular, epistemic warrant is not constant over time, so theories
may move in and out of the domain of science as new evidence accumulates
and conceptual progress is made A twilight zone does exist, with theories
that are neither scientific nor quite pseudoscientific, but we can readily
come up with clear instances ofboth kinds, which is all that is needed for the
viability of the normative demarcation project . ...

Id. at 92.
124.
125.

Id. at 94.
Id.
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unscientific in nature? This claim is arguably different from the
approach that Laudan proposes, which is to argue that the claims of
creationism amount to bad science.
On the other hand, Laudan's approach of looking at theoretical
claims in a more piecemeal fashion may be another way to find
Establishment Clause violations, if applied as part of a broader
approach that looks for evidence that some religious purpose appears to
motivate the theory as a whole. If any particular claim purports to be
scientific, yet does not hold up to empirical testing, it might not
automatically violate the Establishment Clause - but it could, if the
failure to hold up to empirical testing complements or even directly
constitutes evidence that the theory appears to be motivated by religious
faith.
This was the approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court when it
ultimately considered creation science in Edwards v. Aguillard,126 a
1987 case regarding a law in Louisiana requiring that creation science
be taught along with evolution. Without deciding whether creation
science qualified as an actual science, the Court struck down the law on
the grounds that the law lacked a secular purpose - one of the three
prongs of the Lemon testl 27 - and therefore violated the Establishment
Clause.1 28 In doing so, the Court rejected the state's argument that the
law sought to protect academic freedom and so had a secular purpose,
on the basis that, rather than giving teachers freedom, the law
conversely limited their ability to determine what should be taught. 129
The Court also stated that "[t]eaching a variety of scientific theories
about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done
with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science
instruction."1 30

126. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
127. In order to pass the Lemon test, a government action: (1) must have a
legitimate secular purpose; (2) must not have the primary effect of either advancing
or inhibiting religion; and (3) must not result in "excessive entanglement" of religion
and the government. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971).
128. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585-94.
129. Id. at 587-89.
130. Id. at 594.
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This approach was also taken in Selman v. Cobb County School
District,13 ' where the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia ruled that the practice of a public school placing a sticker on a
science textbook stating that "evolution is a theory, not a fact" violated
the Establishment Clause. 132 The court ruled that, while the policy did
advance legitimate secular purposes - encouraging critical thinking and
reducing offense to those whose beliefs might conflict with evolution
the policy had the effect of advancing religion, as "an informed,
reasonable observer would interpret the Sticker to convey a message of
endorsement of religion." 33 Ultimately,
[T]here has been a lengthy debate between advocates of evolution
and proponents of religious theories of origin specifically concerning
whether evolution should be taught as a fact or as a theory, and the
School Board appearsto have sided with the proponents of religious
34
theories of origin in violation of the Establishment Clause.1
Selman was later remanded to the court by the Eleventh Circuit for
35
further fact-finding, after which it was settled out of court.1
Some courts have departed from this approach, as seen more
recently in debates in the aughts over intelligent design (or ID). In
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,136 the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania ruled that a Pennsylvania school
district policy requiring the teaching of intelligent design, as an
37
alternative to evolution, violated the Establishment Clause.1
In doing so, the court ruled that intelligent design failed to qualify
as a science, for among other reasons because it employed the same
false logic - that to the extent evolutionary theory is discredited,
intelligent design is confirmed - that "doomed creation science in the
131. Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005),
vacated and remanded, 449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
132. Id. at 1312.
133. Id. at 1306.
134. Id. at 1307 (emphasis added).
Selman v. Cobb County School District, AMERICANS UNITED FOR
135.
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.au.org/ourwork/legal/lawsuits/selman-v-cobb-county-school-district.
136. Katzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
137. Id. at 765-66 (stating that it was "abundantly clear that the Board's ID
Policy violates the Establishment Clause").
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1980s." 38 It also failed to qualify as a science because it "violates the
centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and permitting
supernatural causation," its "negative attacks on evolution have been
refuted by the scientific community," and it "has failed to gain
acceptance in the scientific community, it has not generated peerreviewed publications, nor has it been the subject of testing and
research." 39 Therefore, "since ID is not science, the conclusion is
inescapable that the only real effect of the ID Policy is the advancement
of religion." 4 0 The policy thus violated the Establishment Clause.1 4 1
Many lauded the reasoning of the court. As law professor Peter
Irons states, "the question of whether ID is science was essential to the
court's ruling against the Dover school board's effort to include ID in
the biology curriculum." 4 2 This is because, Irons argues, if intelligent
design were actually a legitimate scientific theory, it would be
irrelevant even if the motives of those who adopted the policy were
religious in nature. 143 "Consider, for example, civil rights legislation.
Even if legislators who sponsor such laws proclaim their belief that
racial discrimination is morally sinful and violates Biblical commands,
the purely secular nature of civil rights laws makes these professions of
religious belief irrelevant to their constitutionality." 44
But there are several problems with this argument. First, religious
motivation, or appearance thereof, could matter even if something has
a legitimate non-religious purpose. The "evolution is a theory, not a
fact" sticker example in the Selman case makes this point.
Second, and conversely, merely because something is not a science
does not make it an Establishment Clause violation. A difference exists
between a claim that something cannot be taught because it is not good
science - which is not necessarily a constitutional violation - and a

claim that something cannot be taught because it is motivated by
religious purpose - which is a constitutional violation. Even
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
Design, 68
143.
144.

Id. at 735.
Id.
Id. at 764.
Id.
Peter Irons, Disasterin Dover: The Trials (and Tribulations)ofIntelligent
MONT. L. REv. 59, 64 (2007).
Id.
Id.
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pseudoscience need not amount to an Establishment Clause violation if
there is no religiosity behind it. This is why it is important to look into
purpose to find an Establishment Clause violation.
Here the piecemeal approach advocated by Laudan can aid, not
only in determining that something should not be taught in classrooms
because it is not sound information - regardless of whether religion
might also be a factor - but also in smoking out what is, in fact,
motivated by religious purpose. This is comparable to the way that
inconsistencies in claimed legitimate justifications can snuff out
illegitimate purposes in antidiscrimination law. Some religious claims
can, and in fact are, made inductively, within traditionally scientific
constraints. Some of those claims are nonetheless dubious, which leads
us to reject those claims. In the process, courts can smoke out ostensible
appeals to scientific legitimacy.
Third is the difficulty in deciding whether something is science or
not. This is the argument of Laudan, and it is an argument supported by
other examples that have nothing to do with religion, such as the
multiverse theories, over which those in the scientific community are
split (and thus would be split as to whether they should be taught in
classrooms as legitimate, sound science). Here it is necessary to note
that, whether or not religion might be involved, courts do have to make
decisions about what qualifies as adhering to scientific method and
what does not.
In fact, beyond controversies over creation science or intelligent
design, which are relatively rare, far more common are decisions that
courts must make about admitting expert witness testimony under the
Daubert standard, which requires that testimony adhere to scientific
methodology to be allowed in court. 145 This comparison, however, only
further illuminates the sensibility of the approach advocated by Laudan.
First, some scholars have criticized the Daubertapproach, arguing
that judges are not equipped to make determinations about what
46
qualifies as adhering to scientific methodology and what does not.1
The same criticism applies here, and while scientists themselves are
certainly capable of determining whether something like creation
145. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993).
146. See, e.g., Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: Results of a
National Survey ofJudges on JudgingExpert Evidence in a Post-DaubertWorld, 25
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001).
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science is in fact a science, avoidance of that entire question is both
possible and practical for reaching the same result in most, if not all,
cases.
Here, the brief filed by Nobel Laureate Nicolaas Bloembergen in
Daubertis apposite. 147 Bloembergen is among the camp arguing against
the adoption of the Daubert standard, and instead retaining the Frye
standard, which required that admissible evidence achieved general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community. 148 Bloembergen
argues that a critical difference between science and law is that "while
in science it is recognized that 'truth' is extremely mutable, in
adjudication 'truth' for the limited purpose of resolving disputes must
become final and immutable in a relatively short time."1 49
By using publication and peer review as a standard, the
determination whether particular principles and methodology have
received acceptance within the scientific community is one which
courts can make. The determination whether particular scientific
conclusions are or are not correct or accepted by science is one which
judges need not make.1 50
Adopting the standard Bloembergen advocates leads to the same result,
as faith would certainly not be seen as a science, and so would not be
seen as scientific in the eyes of law. However, it is the concession that
Bloembergen makes to undergird his argument - that, in science, truth
is mutable - where the greater point lies. This concession is particularly
compelling in light of the doubt that modem science casts on the very
method of scientific inquiry to get to the truth.
Second, even accepting the Daubert approach as sensible, there is
arguably a substantial difference between determining whether specific
testimony passes scientific muster and determining whether an entire
field of alleged science does. The multiverse example, which has
divided scientists themselves, shows the insensibility of judges making
such determinations, and even of relying on general acceptance among
scientists. The piecemeal approach advocated by Laudan, and further
147.
Brief Amici Curiae of Nicolaas Bloembergen et al., Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102).
148. Id. (referencing Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
149. Id. at 22.
150. Id. at 25.
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supported by this Article, is far more consistent with the Daubert
approach, than that taken by the courts in McLean or Kitzmiller.
To be clear, this approach does not deny that certain
pseudoscientific theories could, in fact, be weeded out by taking
alternative approaches. For example, creation science and intelligent
design could be categorized as pseudoscientific for their evident lack of
151
good faith commitment to methodological naturalism.
For the purposes of an Establishment Clause challenge, however,
this approach is unnecessary. Consistent with Boudry's argument,
while a piecemeal approach may be insufficient standing alone to
distinguish science from pseudoscience, what qualifies as sufficient is
an ever more complex question, in light of the advancements of science.
For courts, it should be easier to determine that something is religiously
motivated than to wade into this morass. The alternative approach of
deferring to experts, as consistent with the pre-Daubertregime, is no
better, as it creates the possibility of excluding science that, again, is
not religious, but could nevertheless be claimed to be pseudoscientific.
In the end, if the legal issue is that the government shall not
establish one religion over another, the central question remains
whether a theory is religious or not - not whether that theory is or is not
science. It is not that demarcation (albeit, not fully principled) is not
possible; it is that demarcation, in this context, is not necessary, and
arguably unmanageable for courts to do in a consistently principled
way.
C. The Implications ofNon-Empirical Theory Confirmation
The concept of non-empirical theory confirmation only adds fresh
support for this alternative approach. What has motivated the
development of this concept is the need to evaluate claims the scientific
nature of which is in doubt, but where religion nevertheless is not at
issue. At the same time, this concept still intends to separate legitimate
science from non-legitimate science, whether theories that fail to meet
its threshold are considered simply insupportable (i.e., bad science), or
not sufficiently scientific in nature even given some leeway for nonRobert T. Pennock, Can't Philosophers Tell the Difference between
151.
Science and Religion? Demarcation Revisited, in BUT Is IT SCIENCE? THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION IN THE CREATION/EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY, supra note
103, at 545.
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empiricism (i.e., fully non-science). Additionally, the concept of nonempirical theory confirmation makes the distinction between religious
and scientific claims more difficult to justify. This distinction becomes
more challenging to support particularly to the extent that some claims
of religion can make epistemic assertions with good faith intention to
commit to scientific principles (whether or not those claims are in the
end valid in content). Still others may commit to principles to which
non-scientific - yet otherwise valid and not pseudoscientic - fields

adhere.
For example, according to Dawid, one critical factor supporting the
validity of a theory is the absence of alternative solutions to the
problems that the theory addresses. 15 2 And, just as some believe that
string theory is the only viable way to unify quantum mechanics and
gravity, religionists certainly claim that their faiths are the only way to
explain many phenomena. This is hardly a viable argument - but, as a
matter of principle, it demonstrates how it becomes increasingly, if at
the extremes only marginally harder, to make the distinction.
In fact, the concept of non-empirical theory confirmation dovetails
with the epistemic logic used in non-scientific, but not pseudoscientific
fields. The three criteria that Dawid identifies - the absence of
alternative solutions, the connection to already-confirmed theories, and
the number of unexpected insights that arise - are hardly criteria that
are limited to evaluating claims based on scientific empiricism. Thus,
to the extent that the non-empirical theory confirmation supports the
continued inclusion of theories like string theory within the umbrella of
science, it can also support the idea that theories of the type Boudry
discusses should be analyzed under a legal framework that looks for
religiosity, not for the arguably more complex issue of being scientific.
These theories fall outside of the conventional, but perhaps should not
automatically be categorized as theories with only a flimsy pretextual
commitment to scientific principles.
Appropriately enough, as Dawid himself explicitly recognizes, his
work builds on the work of Laudan, who has argued that there need not
be a strict hierarchy between empirical and theoretical methods to
assess theories.1 53 In some cases, theoretical methods may be more
important than empirical methods. This argument is thematically
152.
153.

See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
DAWID, supra note 73, at 43.
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consistent with Laudan's imploring of the scientific community to

assess creation science (where, on the whole, theory still takes
precedence over the empirical) in its parts, as the path to demonstrating
its illegitimacy.
Laudan's ideas are complementary: because theoretical methods
might sometimes be as important as empirical ones, ideas should not be
dismissed in full merely because they rely so heavily on theory to have
explanatory power. Instead, sometimes we might better be served by
evaluating the many claims that comprise an entire belief system, on
their own terms. The reason being that even when we reject those claims
resoundingly - for example, the creationist idea that the Earth is only
several thousand years old - we learn more by forcing ourselves to
articulate exactly why a given claim is invalid. And more to the point
in the context of an Establishment Clause claim, we also still show why
pretextual claims to science are just that.
Not surprisingly, then, the approach of Laudan may also have value
in evaluating (both as a matter of scientific and legal demarcation)
scientific advances today, advances that no one is legitimately claiming
to be motivated by religious faith. For example, even though both the
ability to explain and the ability to predict are important in science,
theories that have yet to be mathematically reconciled with quantum
phenomena (e.g., gravity) should not necessarily be considered
unscientific. These theories should not be unconsidered unscientific
despite the need, in the absence of a unifying theory that can reconcile
the quantum with the massive scales of the universe, for them to
overlook some of the fundamental scientific facts about uncertainty
arising from quantum observation, facts that logically apply to all scales
of the universe. To this same point, that, as per quantum mechanics, the
same starting conditions in an experiment will not guarantee the same
results, should not fundamentally cast doubt on prediction-making as a
hallmark of scientific inquiry. Instead, these very phenomena urge a
different, more nuanced understanding of such inquiry.
And string theory and multiverse theories should not be dismissed
necessarily as unscientific (and potentially excluded as evidence under
Daubert), even though they have not yet led to testable (or tested)
predictions. Rather, such theories should be evaluated, when possible,
at more of a retail level. Any such theories will still exist on a grand,
ambitious scale; particularly given that direct observability is not
possible, one must draw inferences throughout the entirety of the theory
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in order to make it work. Still, there is a difference between scrutinizing
these parts, then concluding that the entire theory fails, and evaluating
the theory as a whole by standards of what qualifies as science, then
concluding not merely that the theory fails, but that it is simply not
scientific.
Naturally, for purposes of adjudication under Daubert, courts must
wade more into the demarcation morass when religion is not an issue.
In those situations, the Establishment Clause approach is unavailable to
complement the piecemeal approach, which itself is arguably
insufficient standing alone to distinguish science from pseudoscience.
Nevertheless, the approach should still play a significant, if not
necessarily determinative part in weeding out what theories cannot be
introduced, either because they are bad science or non-scientific, to
complement approaches like Dawid's non-empirical theory
confirmation. This method is appropriate considering that, in this
particular arena where there is less likely to be a bad-faith appeal to
science, it will be more difficult to delineate science from
pseudoscience simply by looking to any given theory's global
commitments to general scientific principles.
In the end, these cutting-edge scientific theories do in fact blur the
distinction between science and faith. Because it is important to
preserve the integrity of science, perhaps the best way to do so is to take
even seemingly outlandish claims in religion and science seriously
enough to confront them. This would not only be for the purpose of
getting closer to yet-unknown truths, but also for the purposes of legal
adjudication of claims. Great value may lie in grappling with the
grandest of ideas - even where complete empirical verification will
always be just beyond the horizon.
CONCLUSION

In these ways, the most cutting-edge advances in modem science,
ironically, shed light on how we might, under the law, address the most
ancient and traditional human beliefs. On the one hand, whether
something is or is not scientific under the law need not have any bearing
on the legitimacy of the personal decisions about faith. There are
certainly legitimate arguments against the existence of God (and, at
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that, a perfect one).1 54 And the advancements of modem science cannot
change the propositional content of arguments for God.
On the other hand, these advancements arguably provide support
for preserving individuals' ability to make personal decisions about
faith in conditions of uncertainty - without the law, in seeking to avoid
the endorsement of any religion, making unnecessarily broad
proclamations about those beliefs. The very consciousness by which
humans experience pleasure, pain, and other sensations is the very
consciousness that allows them to experience reality, in quantum terms,
as definite points, rather than indefinite waves. This ability is thus
extraordinary: consciousness matters not merely because it affords our
remarkable autonomy (including the ability to make decisions about
religious belief or non-belief) but also because consciousness
encapsulates, even more broadly than human capability for autonomy
and intention, the entire range of human experience.15 5 At the same
time, this very consciousness is restricted by the limits of human
observation as applied to science, religion, and any other field.
Consciousness thus urges a more nuanced demarcation between such
fields.
It is no surprise that, regardless of what someone ultimately
believes to be true or not true, these issues are exceedingly difficult to
grapple with. Even those who choose seriously to contend with them
can hardly seem to differentiate at times, in a principled, consistent way,
between fact, falsehood, and opinion. The threshold at which people
decide to believe that something is, indeed, a fact is difficult, if not
impossible to define with accuracy. This threshold is different for
everyone, and perhaps even variable within the same person. The state
of science is such that even human beings who actively seek knowledge
are still, in many respects, operating in much blindness about the
154. For example, even putting science aside, from a purely philosophical
perspective, human suffering, especially at its worst, is a phenomenon for which even
the best faith-based explanations arguably fall short. If every moment is, indeed,
frozen in time, then the passage of time - and, ultimately, the occurrence of human
death - does not undo suffering.
155. It is the Author's opinion that it is impossible for humans to not, to some
degree, value consciousness: those who value pleasure in any measure certainly must
value it, and, consistent with the Anthropic Principle, even those that proclaim not to
value consciousness must implicitly value rationality - which comes only from a
conscious ability.
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universe. Science establishes that human beings are fighting against a
number of different other phenomena as well: the entropy of the
universe in general, and (for practical purposes) the inevitable mortality
of humans, phenomena that speak not merely to our metaphysics, but
also to the limits of our epistemology.
A last lesson that flows from all of this is the wisdom of tolerating
the beliefs of others - whether they are traditional faiths or otherwise.
It is not just our consciousness that we necessarily value, but also those
of others. Against this backdrop of multiple uncertainties and confines,
quantum mechanics suggests that people are fighting not just to live,
but, in a very concrete way, for reality. Human beings are fighting to
create a reality that is unique and irreplaceable, scientifically frozen into
place. In an important way, that reality cannot be taken away - not by
any event in the future, and not even if every other person in the world
did not recognize that reality. But it also cannot be shaped any other
way, by any other entity. When a life ends, there is, from all we know,
a finality: there is a unique, untrodden path that life could have taken,
yet which will never be taken, by that life or by any other conscious
being in spacetime. In the face of such immense stakes we all have no
choice but to live life in the face of so much that remains unknown and
inaccessible about the universe, and, in turn, about the fundamental
nature of being.
This wisdom further urges an alternative approach to demarcating
science from faith under the law. Sometimes in matters of life and
death, which often come into play in other aspects of the law beyond
the Establishment Clause, there is much less room for tolerance of
personal beliefs. 15 6 Yet, it remains that beliefs about life and death
themselves are very personal; the answers can be very hard to arrive at
and come with great personal cost. Those beliefs should thus be
respected, to the greatest extent possible.157 Returning finally to
156. For a lengthy discussion of such issues by the Author, see Marvin Lim, A
New Approach to the Ethics of Life: The "Will to Live" in Lieu of Inherent Dignity
and Autonomy-Based Approaches, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 27 (2015).
157. This is not to say that broad societal interests, which drive some to impose
certain faith and morality on others, are not important; they may even capture a very
real effect on individuals. But ultimately, the impact of any decision is usually most
felt at the level of the individual, who must experience, and ultimately live, with the
choices he or she makes. Cf ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 131 (1969)
("I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-
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Hamlet's question of to be or not, the words of philosopher Ronald
Dworkin seem equally applicable here: what is right for an individual
"depends on so much else that is special about him - about the shape
and character of his life and his own sense of his integrity and critical
interests - that no uniform collective decision can possibly hope to
serve everyone even decently."158

Regardless of the ultimate decisions one makes, to answer Hamlet's
question of "to be or not to be," still requires a (broadly defined) leap
of faith. And, at the end of the day, human beings, whether with
intention or by effect, must choose to answer Hamlet's question of
being or not being. This question is outside the realm of science, which
cannot make the judgment calls that are needed to answer it. With
related, similarly grand questions - like why is there existence rather
than none, and what, if anything, allowed the universe (or any universe)
to be - science would firmly say it does not have the equipment to
answer.
It may, however, be in the realm of other disciplines - particularly
those that are outside the realm of empirical science, but which need
not be pseudoscientific and may utilize epistemic logic, in good faith,
nonetheless. These disciplines may be better equipped to say whether,
in the midst of inevitable uncertainty, there is some not insignificant
chance that some omnipresent entity like a god could pervade the world.
Dawkins' argument that the "God hypothesis" is genuinely extravagant
is from one perspective, understandable. From another perspective, the
possibilities posed by infinite universes - along with an idea that some
omnipresent force, while perhaps not what many traditionally think a
directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or
an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals
and policies of my own and realizing them."). People shall be encouraged to recognize
the impact of their actions on other persons, who live their own unique and
irreplaceable lives. And often people make decisions that, knowingly or unknowingly,
hurt themselves. But, it is the Author's opinion that, barring exceptional
circumstances like imminent threats (i.e., to life), they should make those decisions as
they wish, to live their lives as only they can live them. In the end, these are difficult
decisions, which urge tolerance. Cf Joseph Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm
Principle, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
158 (Susan Mendus ed., 1988) ("[A]utonomy requires that many morally acceptable,
though incompatible, forms of life be available to a person.").
158. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 213 (1993).
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god is, nevertheless infinitely pervades time, space, and being, 159 in lieu
of the possibility of nothingness - may not be so extravagant, despite
being outside of the realm of science. 16 0 In such uncertainty, and within
the limits of the possibility of human consciousness, to infer some
meaningful likelihood that there is such a force, on these bases, is
arguably as valid as deducing there certainly is not.
Put differently, choosing to have religious faith seems slightly less
unreasonable if one can understand how epistemological leaps are made
in both faith and science alike. With such understanding, it certainly
159. In the Author's opinion, this "god" may or may not be perfect, and may or
may not have any particular designs or intentions for intelligent human life that we
are capable of inferring, even assuming the intention for such life to exist in the first
place.
160. The idea, which has some support from science, that the world has always
existed - that the past is infinite - is mystifying to the extent that we believe that
moments that have not yet occurred expand in only one direction, the future, while
the past has already happened and is frozen in time. To the extent our logic cannot
comprehend an infinity in both directions, the idea of a being that reconciles these
concepts by reconceptualizing traditional notions of time and causality - whether
everything must have a cause, whether something can come from nothing (and what
nothing actually is), whether the universe might be beginningless - is as attractive to
some as cosmological explanations that not only remain in debate, but also, many say,
are simply beyond human capacity to verify scientifically. Indeed, our natural
intuitions about cause-and-effect are called into question whether one believes that
our universe originated from nothing or believes that it always existed. For discussion
of these debates, see GRAHAM ROBERT OPPY, ARGUING ABOUT GODS (2006) and
David Albert, On the Origin of Everything, NY TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/books/review/a-universe-from-nothing-bylawrence-m-krauss.html?_r-O. This would be a being, whose own infinite existence
is beyond human comprehension, permitting the past to extend into infinity. As Oppy
states:
[I]t seems to me to be plausible to suppose that one could be faced with
interlocutors who are able to go on giving answers to these questions that
do not indicate any evident lapses from rationality, but who disagree greatly
with one another on the answers to given questions. On the one hand, I
suppose that there can be theists who have answers to all of these questions
that, taken together, form a coherent and rationally defensible view of the
world. On the other hand, I suppose that there can be non-theists who have
answers to all of these questions that, taken together, form a coherent and
rationally defensible view of the world. If these suppositions are correct,
then we should be very sceptical about claims that there are successful
cosmological arguments that serve to vindicate either theism or atheism.
OPPY, supra, at 173.
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becomes clearer that life is valuable because of what human experience,
however temporary and uncertain, means to reality. That value arguably
exists irrespective of one's exact faith; for some, that value is deepened
because of faith.
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